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32 
THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: PRODUCT LIABILITY  
OR ONE HELL OF A NUISANCE? 
 




Pharmaceutical companies have received heavy scrutiny in the news 
lately for their pricing tactics and hand in the opioid epidemic.1  For 
example, Time, The Atlantic, Fortune, and CBS have all published negative 
articles regarding the unnecessary hiking of drug prices.2   Even before the 
judgment against Purdue Pharmaceutical for their part in the opioid 
epidemic, public perception of the pharmaceutical industry and their 
manufacturing of opioid-based medication was negative.3  An article in 
Vox described pharmaceutical company efforts at successfully enticing 
doctors to prescribe opioids.4  After Purdue Pharmaceuticals and other 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers were found liable for part of the opioid 
epidemic, public perception praised the Judge for finally punishing the 
 
    * Kristen S. Jones is a 2021 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law. 
The author would like to thank Professor Mark Modak-Truran for his advice throughout 
the drafting of this Comment. The author is also grateful to her friends and family for 
their support.  
    1. See Justin McCarthy, Big Pharma Sinks to the Bottom of U.S. Industry 
Rankings, GALLUP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/266060/big-pharma-
sinks-bottom-industry-rankings.aspx. 
    2. See Laura Entis, Why Does Medicine Cost So Much? Here’s How Drug 
Prices Are Set, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5564547/drug-prices-medicine/; 
See also Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices 
Doesn’t Add Up, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 23, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-cost-research-and-
development/585253/; See Chris Morris, Big Pharma Raised Prices of Several 
Prescription Drugs on First Day of 2020, FORTUNE (Jan. 2, 2020), 
https://fortune.com/2020/01/02/prescription-drug-price-increase-2020/; see also Megan 
Cerullo, 2020 is three days old and drug prices are already jumping, CBS NEWS (Jan. 3, 
2020),, 5:17 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/big-pharma-companies-raised-prices-
on-more-than-400-drugs-to-start-2020/. 
    3. See Domenica Ghanem, You Want to Kill Drug Dealers, Start with Big 
Pharma, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://ips-dc.org/want-kill-
drug-dealers-start-big-pharma/. 
    4. German Lopez, Drug Companies Bought Doctors Fancy Meals – And Then 
Those Doctors Prescribed More Opioids, VOX (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/5/15/17355722/opioid-epidemic-doctor-
pharma-insys. 
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companies responsible for the opioid epidemic.5  The high tensions and 
negative perception towards the pharmaceutical industry have led to 
lawsuits against private individuals for their association and involvements 
with such companies.6 
In 2017, there were more than 191 million opioid prescriptions.7  
One in four patients that receive pro-longed opioid treatment will struggle 
with addiction.8  Two out of three drug overdose deaths involve an opioid.9  
Since the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies have continuously 
downplayed the addictive nature of opioids.10  Out of 700,000 overdose 
deaths, roughly 68% are due to overdoses involving opioids.11  
Approximately 130 individuals die each day from opioids.12  From 2015 
through 2018, the opioid epidemic has cost the United States approximately 
$631 billion in association with addiction.13  Of the $631 billion, roughly 
$205 billion is spent on healthcare, $253 billion on premature deaths, $49 
billion associated with crime, $39 billion associated with childcare, and 
approximately $96 billion arises from a loss in productivity.14   
Opioids are prescribed to treat moderate-to-severe pain.15  Risks 
associated with prescription opioids include “misuse, addiction, overdose, 
 
    5. See Chris McGreal, Capitalism Gone Wrong: How Big Pharma Created 
America’s Opioid Carnage, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/24/opioids-crisis-big-pharma-drugs-
carnage. 
    6. Charles W. Van Way, III, Bashing Big Pharma, US NAT’L LIBRARY OF 
MEDICINE NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH (Mar.-Apr. 2019), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6461324/. 
    7. 2018 Annual Surveillance Report of Drug-Related Risks and Outcomes, 
CDC (Aug. 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-
surveillance-report.pdf.  https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-
surveillance-report.pdf?s_cid=cs_828. 
    8. Addiction and Overdose, CDC (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html. 
    9. H. Hedgegaard, AM. Miniño & M. Warner, Drug Overdose Deaths in the 
United States, 1999-2017, CDC (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db329.htm. 
  10. What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic, HHS (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html.   
  11. Understanding the Epidemic, CDC (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.  
  12. Id. 
  13. Stoddard Davenport, Alexandra Weaver, Matt Caverly, Economic Impact 
of Non-Medical Opioid Use in the United States, Mortality and Longevity,  SOCIETY OF 
ACTUARIES (Oct. 2019), https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-
report/2019/econ-impact-non-medical-opioid-use.pdf.  
  14. Id. 
  15. Prescription Opioids, CDC (Aug. 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/prescribed.html. 
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and death, especially with long term use.”16  Currently, opioids are a 
controlled substance and are a schedule II drug.17  Schedule II drugs include 
any medication that has “a high potential for abuse.”18  Any individual that 
wishes to manufacture or distribute any controlled substances must register 
with the Attorney General.19  All manufacturers and distributors of 
controlled substances must also comply with the labeling and packaging 
requirements under applicable federal and state laws.20  
 Due to the opioid epidemic, the U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services outlined a five-point plan to combat emerging issues 
which includes “(1) improving access to treatment and recovery services; 
(2) promoting use of overdose-reversing drugs; (3) strengthening our 
understanding of the epidemic through better public health surveillance; (4) 
providing support for cutting edge research on pain and addiction; and (5) 
advancing better practices for pain management.”21   
 This Comment argues that the judgment in State v. Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals was incorrect in holding defendants liable under the 
doctrine of public nuisance and should, therefore, be vacated.  First, as to 
the judgment, the Judge expanded the definition of a public right beyond its 
traditional scope without cause, the Judge incorrectly applied the theory of 
proximate cause, and the Judge was likely persuaded by public perception 
in his ruling.   Second, the doctrine of public nuisance should not expand 
into the realm of product liability instead of using traditional doctrines 
aimed at consumer protection, such as product liability or negligence.  
Third, the legislature should enact new consumer protection laws to protect 
consumers from pharmaceutical companies that act egregiously.  
 In State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the Court held defendants 
liable for false and misleading advertising associated with the 
manufacturing, promoting, and selling of opioid-based drugs.22   It found 
the plaintiff, Oklahoma, experienced significant harm associated with 
opioid addiction through the costs of services.23  Further, the Court found 
that the defendants willfully understated the consequences of opioid-based 
 
  16. Prescription Opioid: Overview, CDC (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing/overview.html. 
  17. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(2) (West 2018).   
  18. Id.   
  19. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822(a)(2) (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 823(a) (West 2018).   
  20. 21 U.S.C.A. § 825 (West 2018). 
  21. Thomas E. Price, Secretary Price Announces HHS Strategy for Fighting 
Opioid Crisis, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2017-speeches/secretary-price-
announces-hhs-strategy-for-fighting-opioid-crisis/index.html.   
  22. State v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12 
(Dist. Ct. Okla. Aug. 26, 2019). 
  23. Pardue Phrama LP., 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21. 
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drugs, broadened product distribution, took data out of context, and actively 
promoted opioid-based medication in contrast to company policy. 24 
 The proceeding section will provide a brief historical development 
of public nuisance law.  Next, this paper will discuss the procedural history, 
facts, and the judgment in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals.  Subsequently, 
this Comment will apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the facts of 
this case.  This Comment will then compare the facts and holding in State 
v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals with similar cases regarding product liability 
claims under the theory of public nuisance.  Thereafter, this Comment will 
discuss the possible rationales behind the judgment.  Lastly, this Comment 
will provide a summary of possible consequences that may occur as a result 
of the extension.  
 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE 
 
 Traditionally, the scope of public nuisance was connected to the 
infringement of public rights or in connection to land.25  The purpose of 
public nuisance is to deter activities that are harmful to the community.26  
Public nuisance is typically considered with but not limited to “interference 
with the public health, … public safety, … public morals, … [and] public 
peace.”27  
Historically, courts rarely used the doctrine of public nuisance for 
criminal liability because it was reserved for limited circumstances 
involving the interference of public or royal rights.28  Anonymous expanded 
the doctrine of public nuisance beyond a cause of action for monarchies to 
encompass private individuals and suggested that public nuisances must 
cause specific harm for an individual to have standing with the claim.29   
In the 1536 case of Anonymous, the plaintiff, a property owner, 
brought suit against the defendant for blocking the king’s highway.30  The 
court held that allowing suits for any individual harmed under the doctrine 
of public nuisance would open the floodgates of litigation.31  Therefore, 
 
  24. Id. at *11. 
  25. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 86 at 617-18 (5th ed. 
1984).  
  26. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003).   
  27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B) (Am. 
Law Inst. 1979).  
  28. Reynolds, Osborne N. Jr., Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 Okla. 
L. Rev. 318, 319 (1978) (citing E Garrett & H. Garrett, Nuisances (4d ed. 1908)).  
  29. Anon., Y.B. Mich., 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (Eng.), reprinted in 
History and Sources of the Common Law 98 (1970).   
  30. Id.   
  31. Id.   
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only individuals who have suffered a special or unique harm different from 
others may have standing to bring a claim under the doctrine of public 
nuisance.32  The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s use of the road was 
unique and that he suffered more significant harm than the average 
individual using the road.33  Thus, he was permitted to bring this nuisance 
action against the defendant because the roadblock uniquely harmed the 
plaintiff.34  
Since Anonymous, the doctrine of public nuisance has commonly 
been used in cases for obstruction of highways or waterways and noise 
violations.35  For example, an action for public nuisance was brought 
against railroad companies alleging that the railroad created dangerous 
conditions for individuals that wished to travel the road alongside the 
tracks.36  The court found the railroad companies not liable under the 
doctrine of public nuisance for the risk of harm associated with traveling 
alongside the track.37  They reasoned that legislative authorization and 
compliance shield companies from public nuisance so long as they are 
compliant with the applicable law.38  The court found the railroad 
companies not liable based on legislative approval to operate the railroad.39  
However, more recently, public nuisance has been used for claims 
involving environmental grievances, banking, and product liability 
claims.40 
The current elements of public nuisance include (1) standing, (2) 
public right, (3) a substantial and unreasonable interference with that right 
by the defendant, and (4) proximate cause.41   
 
  32. Id.   
  33. Id.   
  34. Id.   
  35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. c. 
(Am. Law. Inst. 1979). 
  36. Bordentown & S.A. Turnpike Road v. Camden & A.R. &. Transp. Co., 17 
N.J.L. 314, 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1839). 
  37. Id. at 320-21. 
  38. Id.  
  39. Id. at 319-20.  
  40. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004); Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 101 F. 3d 503, 505 (7th 
Cir. 1996); City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 497-99 (6th 
Cir. 2010). 
  41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B).).) (Am. 
Law. Inst. 1979). Proximate cause is added under case law and recognized in the notes of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts but not in the elements of the rule. The proceeding 
case explicitly recognized proximate cause as an element of public nuisance: Burns v. 
Simon Properties Group, LLP, 996 N.E. 2d 1208, 1212 (Ill. 2013). For clarity, the 
analysis section will further breakdown each element of public nuisance into smaller 
“sub-categories.”  
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According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual must 
have standing to recover for injuries sustained by a public nuisance.42  The 
injury suffered must be “of a kind different from that suffered by other 
members of the public exercising the right common to the general public 
that was the subject of interference.”43  Furthermore, private individuals or 
statutorily approved government entities or officials may bring suits for 
public nuisance.44  
Under the doctrine of public nuisance, the injury must occur while 
exercising a public right.45  According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, “a public right is one common to all members of the general public. 
It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone has 
not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.”46   
Once a public right or an exception has been established, the 
doctrine of public nuisance requires that interference with the public right 
to be unreasonable and significant.47  Unreasonable interference may be 
intentional or unintentional actions by the defendant.48  In addition, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a list of interferences that might be 
unreasonable.49 When a defendant acts intentionally to interfere with an 
individual’s public right or if there is a high probability of interference, then 
the defendant’s actions are unreasonable.50  However, even if an 
individuals’ actions were intentional, then the court must consider the 
potential benefits, costs, and harms associated with the defendant’s 
actions.51  In contrast to intentional interference, if the action that harms a 
public right was unintentional, then the court will consider if the 
 
  42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC 
Nuisance § 821(C) cmt. c, (Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
  43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC 
NUISANCE § 821(C) (Am. Law. Inst. 1979). 
  44. Id. 
  45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. 
Law. Inst. 1979).  
  46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g. 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979) 
  47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts: Significant Harm § 821(F) (Am. Law Inst. 
1979). 
  48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
  49. Id.  
  50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL INVASION – WHAT 
CONSTITUTES § 825 (Am. Law Inst. 1979).  
  51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g, (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: § 826 (Am. Law Inst. 1979).  
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interference was due to other actionable torts, such as negligence.52  
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual is negligent 
if they act or fail to act regarding a duty and said action or inaction falls 
below a reasonable standard of care designed to protect others from an 
unreasonable risk of harm.53  Furthermore, a defendant may be negligent 
for failing to warn an individual of the potential harm.54  
After an interference has been established, the court must consider 
if such interference was significant.55  Almost all activities can interfere, 
harm, or annoy those in society.56  The significance of the harm must be 
objectively determined considering all relevant factors.57 
 
  52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979).  
  53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 282 cmt. a-e, 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). Case law suggests that a finding of negligence requires that the 
defendant owed a duty of care to the public and that the defendant breached said public 
duty by failing to maintain a reasonable standard of care. N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., 
271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Typically, in determining whether a duty 
exists, courts “balance … foreseeability, public policy, and the relationship between the 
parties. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 1242 
(Ind. 2003); see also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E. 2d 1099, 1125 
(Ill. 2004). However, the balancing test is only required if the law has not yet established 
such a duty by law. Id. The instant case, State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, pertains to 
public nuisance in the context of manufacturing opioid-based medications. Therefore, we 
will consider the duties that pharmaceutical companies owe.  In Oklahoma, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers only owe a duty to the prescribers. Edwards v. Basel 
Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997). Their duty to prescribers only requires 
that they disclose any of the potential side effects or risks associated with the use of their 
products. Id. New York and Florida impose similar duties on pharmaceutical companies. 
See Amos v. Biogen Idec Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 164, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 2015); see also 
Levine v. Wyeth Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2010). 
  54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN § 18 
(Am. Law Inst. 2010). In context to the instant case, State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, 
pharmaceutical companies have a general duty to warn consumers of potential risks 
associated with the use of medication when required by the FDA or when other 
exceptions have been identified by law. Edwards, 933 P.2d 298, 301-02. However, 
compliance with the FDA is not a shield from liability and a mere minimum duty that 
must be met. Id. at 303. Therefore, states may impose heightened duties on 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Id.  
  55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F) 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
  56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g. 
  57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GRAVITY OF HARM – FACTORS § 827 
cmt., b, (Am. Law Inst. 1979).  
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Proximate cause has been interpreted to include cause in fact and 
legal cause.58  Cause in fact requires that there be “a reasonable certainty 
that a defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.”59  In contrast to cause 
in fact, legal cause “addresses the separate issue of how far legal 
responsibility should extend for a party’s actions.”60  An individual is the 
legal cause of harm if their conduct “is a substantial factor in producing the 
injury.”61  See footnote 62 for notes on the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s 
approach to proximate cause.62  The purpose of proximate cause is to limit 
liability to injuries that are foreseeable as a result of a tortfeasor’s actions.63  
The Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that “proximate 
cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively 
possible and convenient.’”64  A defendant is the proximate cause of an 
injury when their actions, “in a natural and continuous sequence [resulting 
 
  58. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (Ill. 2004) (citing Lee v. 
Chicago Transit Authority, 605 N.E. 2d 492, 502 (Ill. 1992)); see also Ashley County, 
Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F. 3d 659, 667 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Chambers v. Stern, 64 
S.W. 3d 737, 744 (Ark. 2002)).  
  59. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E. 2d 493, 502). As put 
by the Supreme Court of Missouri, legal cause turns on whether the “harm is the 
reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.” City of St. Louis v. 
Benjamin Moore &. Co., 226 S.W. 3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007). Therefore, had the tortfeasor 
not acted, then the harm would not have occurred. Id. at 114; see also Jones, 155 P.3d 9, 
14-15. The Supreme Court of Ohio provided factors to consider when determining the 
remoteness of harm from the alleged conduct. Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 
N.E.2d 1136, 1152 (Ohio 2002) (citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 
503 U.S. 248, 269 (2002)). First, a court must consider whether the injury was direct or 
indirect. Id. Second, if a court must employ complicated or burdensome rules to 
determine if the injury was direct, then the injury was likely indirect. Id. Third, was the 
injured party directly or indirectly related to the conduct. Id.  
  60. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on 
Torts § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W. 3d 110, 114 
(citing Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W. 3d 852, 856 (Mo. 1993)).   
  61. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th51, 103 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2017) (citing Soule v. General Motors Corp, 8 Cal. 4th 548, 572 (Cal. 1994)).  
  62. The restatement, in contrast to cases, uses the term “legal cause” instead of 
proximate cause. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR 
TORTIOUS CONDUCT § 29 cmt. a-b, (Am. Law Inst. 2010). Proximate cause includes 
cause in fact and legal cause. The restatement’s approach to legal cause satisfies both the 
common law definition of cause in fact and legal cause. Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS: LEGAL CAUSE; WHAT CONSTITUTES § 431 cmt. a-d, (Am. Law Inst. 1934). 
Therefore, although citing cases, this is not inconsistent with the restatement. Instead, 
this is to assist readers in providing familiar terms that are utilized in cases. 
  63. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mendoza 
v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).  
  64. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 502 US. 258, 268 (2002) (citing W. 
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 p. 
264 (5th ed. 1984)).  
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from their actions], unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced 
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”65  A 
plaintiff who cannot establish some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged fails to plead a key element for 
establishing proximate causation, independent of and in addition to other 
traditional elements of proximate cause.66  However, an intervening act 
may shield an individual from liability if such an act is “sufficient to stand 
as the cause of the injury” and the intervening act is “totally independent” 
of the original act.67  
 
A. Public Nuisance: Environmental 
 
 Historically, environmental claims have been brought based on 
noxious odors, pollution, and water contamination.68  Public nuisance was 
the basis for creating and determining the scope of many environmental 
statutory regimes.69  For example, Congress used public nuisance as a basis 
in The Clean (§ 503) Air Act, Water Pollution Control Act (7003), The 
Clean Water Act (§ 504).70  Furthermore, some statutes share the same 
purpose of public nuisance, protecting individuals and govern behavior.71   
 
B. Public Nuisance: Banking 
 
In recent years, the doctrine of public nuisance has been used 
against banks for their part in the subprime mortgage crisis.72  For example, 
in the City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Securities, Inc., Cleveland 
brought suit against financial institutions claiming that their part in the 
 
  65. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 666 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing City of Caddo Valley v. 
George, 340 Ark. 203, 9 S.W.3d 481, 487 (2000)). 
  66. Id.  
  67. Caddo Valley, 9 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg, 725 
S.W. 2d 538, 540 (Ark. 1987)); see also Ashley, 552 F. 3d 659, 667. 
  68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
  69. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 315 (1985).   
  70. S. REP. 96-172. 96th Cong., 1ST Sess. 1979, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 
1979 WL 10338 (Leg. Hist.) 
  71. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps. of 
Eng’rs, 101 F. 3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1996).  
  72. Richard E. Gottlieb, Andrew J. McGuinness, Subprime Lending As A 
Public Nuisance: Casting Blame Mortgage On Lenders And Wall Street For Inner City 
Blight, 62 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 4 (2008).  
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subprime mortgage crisis constituted a public nuisance.73  The plaintiff 
contended that the defendant’s part in creating subprime mortgages, with 
their relaxed lending standards, was not the sole but a partial cause of the 
crisis, which constituted a public nuisance.74  The alleged harm was an 
increase in societal costs due to foreclosures, loss in property tax, 
unemployment, and lower innovation.75  The court was unpersuaded by the 
plaintiff’s argument because the harm alleged was also due to a multitude 
of factors all outside the bank’s control.76  For example, the court found that 
homeowners applied for and defaulted on their loans by their own 
volition.77  Moreover, the defendants engaged in statutorily legal activities 
and did not partake in any illegal activities.78  Therefore, defendants were 
not the proximate cause of the harm and could not be held liable for the 
public nuisance.79  
 
C. Public Nuisance: Class Actions 
 
In addition to municipalities and private individuals bringing claims 
under the doctrine of public nuisance, groups of individuals have attempted 
to assert class actions under the doctrine. The plaintiffs, in Diamond v. 
General Motors, comprised of over seven thousand Los Angeles residence, 
brought a class-action for discharging harmful pollutants into the 
atmosphere against numerous defendants on public nuisance grounds as 
well as others.80  The court dismissed the class-action claim for public 
nuisance because it would unreasonably complicate the litigation, each 
party has suffered different harm, and that each member would have a 
separate interest in this litigation.81  Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to assert 
any specific injury that prevented them from enjoying the use of their 





  73. City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mort. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 498-99 
(6th Cir. 2010). 
  74. Id. at 499. 
  75. Id.  
  76. Id. at 505. 
  77. Id. 
  78. Id. at 505. 
  79. Id. at 506-07. 
  80. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377 (2nd Cir. 
1971).  
  81. Id.at 377-78. 
  82. Id. at 378. 
  83. Id. at 383.  
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D. Public Nuisance: Product Liability 
 
 Historically, the purpose of product liability was to hold 
manufacturers liable for defective products.84  In order to bring a claim for 
product liability it had to be founded on negligence.85  Product liability 
claims are brought because of “defects, design defects, and defects based 
on inadequate instructions or warnings.”86  Beginning around the 1970s, the 
doctrine of public nuisance became a popular mode to litigate product 
liability claims.87  When product liability claims are brought under the 
doctrine of public nuisance, there are four general themes: (1) at the time 
of sale, the product was legally manufactured and; (2) at the time of sale, 
the product was non-defective; (3) after the sale, the harm was indirectly 
caused by an individual other than the manufacturer; and (4) after the sale, 
the manufacturer or distributor had relinquished control of the product.88  
Public nuisance in product liability has been prevalent for quite some 
time.89  Product liability claims have commonly been brought under the 
doctrine of public nuisance regarding the tobacco industry, lead paint 
industry, firearm industry, and, more recently, the pharmaceutical 
industry.90   
 
1. Public Nuisance: Tobacco  
 
In 1998, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. 
territories reached a settlement agreement with cigarette manufacturers 
concerning Medicaid lawsuits.91  The basis for the litigation was that 
 
  84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR 
DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1998).  
  85. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2003) (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 
(N.Y. 1916)).  See also the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF 
COMMERCIAL SELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS § 
1 cmt. a, that further suggests warranty actions could be brought as well.  
  86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY OF COMMERCIAL SELLER OR 
DISTRIBUTOR FOR HARM CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs § 1 cmt. a. 
  87. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 
U. Cin. L. Rev. 741 (2003).   
  88. See Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 
2003); see also Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 673 (8th Cir. 2009); 
see State of Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960 (E.D. Tex. 1997). 
  89. See Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Ashley, 
552 F.3d at 673; see American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at  960. 
  90. See Labzda, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Ashley, 
552 F.3d 659, 673; see American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960. Id.  
  91. Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State 
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cigarette manufacturers caused an increase in medical costs for smoking-
related illnesses.92  
Prior to the 1998 settlement agreement, Texas partially litigated a 
case against cigarette manufacturers under the doctrine of public nuisance. 
In 1997, Texas brought suit against the American tobacco company for the 
increased cost in the state Medicaid program, alleging that tobacco products 
directly caused an increase in costs associated with healthcare.93  The 
district court dismissed the Texas’ claim as to public nuisance because they 
failed to prove how the tobacco companies harmed the state by “improperly 
us[ing] their own property, or that the state itself has been injured in its use 
or employment of its property.”94  Shortly thereafter, the settlement 
agreement was signed.95   
 
2. Public Nuisance: Lead Paint  
 
Up until 1978, lead-based paint was heavily used in residential 
areas.96  The use of lead-based paint ended because lead exposure is highly 
toxic to both children and adults.97  Public nuisance claims against lead 
paint manufacturers were generally sought because of the cost to remove 
lead-based paint and because of increased healthcare costs due to the 
harmful effects on children that were exposed to lead-based paint.98 
In the case of In re Lead Paint Litigation, numerous cities sued lead 
paint manufacturers, alleging increased cost in removing lead-based paint, 
healthcare cost to those exposed, and educating residents on the harmful 
effects of lead.99  The court held that plaintiffs failed to identify a unique 
harm from the lead paint other than “those arising from the common 
right.”100  The court reasoned that a finding of liability would expand public 
 
Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds 25 A.L.R.6th 
435 (Originally published in 2007). 
  92. Id. 
  93. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960. 
  94. Id. at 973.  
  95. Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State 
Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R.6th 
435 (Originally published in 2007). 
  96. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prod. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 73 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017) 
  97. Id. at 79. 
  98. See Id. at 79; see also In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 487 (N.J. 
2007). 
  99. In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d at 487.  
100. Id. at 502. 
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nuisance so far that it may never stop and would “devour in one gulp the 
entire law of tort.” 101 
In 1999, the Attorney General of Rhode Island brought an action for 
public nuisance against lead paint manufacturers.102  Their main contention 
was that lead paint manufacturers concealed and misrepresented the 
harmful effects of lead exposure, which ultimately led to a public health 
crisis from said exposure.103  Lead poisoning was deemed a public health 
crisis due to its permanent and detrimental effect on childhood 
development.104  Due to the harmful effects of lead-based paint, Congress 
and state legislature banned the use of lead-based products and 
implemented educational programs to discuss the harm of exposure.105  The 
court held that the harm caused by lead paint and the impacts it had on 
individuals was not a public right.106  To satisfy the public right requirement 
under the doctrine of public nuisance, the plaintiff must provide more than 
a general interference with “health, safety, peace, comfort or 
convenience.”107 Without a public right, an individual will not be liable 
even if their actions were unreasonable.108  The court furthered its rationale 
on public policy. First, the expansion of public nuisance would be “bad 
law” and result in the “worst sort of tyranny.”109 Second, if the court were 
to expand the doctrine of public nuisance, then it would surpass the intended 
scope of the doctrine.110 
By contrast, in People v. ConAgra, lead paint manufacturers were 
held liable for all injuries sustained as a result of their harmful marketing 
tactics. 111 In this case, California sued lead paint manufacturers, alleging 
that their promoting and manufacturing of lead paint constituted a public 
nuisance.112  In extending public nuisance to product liability, the court 
further stated that a claim for public nuisance based on a product does not 
require the defendant to have full control of the product up until the 
 
101. Id. at 505 (citing Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, 
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3rd Cir. 2001)).  
102. Id. at 439-40.  
103. Id. at 440.  
104. State v. Lead Industries, Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d 428, 436-37 (R.I. 2008). 
105. Id. at 438.  
106. Id. at 453. 
107. Id. at 453-54.  
108. Id.  
109. Id. at 454. (citing Edmund Burke, The Works of Edmund Burke: With a 
Memoir 318 (1860)).  
110. Id. at 453-54 
111. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 166-69 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017) 
112. Id. at 79. 
2021] THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 45 
injury.113  In addition, the court extended public rights to issues that impact 
societal interests at large and found that children have a right to be free from 
lead-based paint in their homes.114  The court held that lead paint 
manufacturers knew of the risks associated with the use of lead paint and 
still promoted and sold their product for residential purposes.115  A 
nuisance, in California, only requires that the defendant be culpable in 
creating a hazardous condition.116  Ultimately, the defendants created a 
public nuisance by failing to warn of the hazardous effects of lead-based 
paint.117  
 
3. Public Nuisance: Firearm 
 
In 2017, approximately 39,773 people died from firearm-related 
injuries in the United States.118  The firearm industry is heavily regulated.119  
Even with such regulations, there are still casualties of violence and 
accidents. As a result of a slew of lawsuits against firearm manufacturers, 
in 2005 Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
to shield gun manufacturers from liability in instances where their products 
are misused or used for any unlawful purposes.120   
In Ileto v. Glock, the plaintiffs, parents of the deceased, sued gun 
manufacturers under the doctrine of public nuisance.121  Ileto argued that 
gun manufacturers interfered with public safety and health in the production 
and promotion of firearms.122  The court held that the families of the victims 
suffered an injury that was “different in kind from the general public.”123  
The court additionally found that the manufacturers were the proximate 
cause of the injuries and death suffered by the victims because the 
manufacturers fostered an “illegal secondary market that foreseeably led to 
a prohibited purchase.”124  The court further stated that products might be 
 
113. Id. at 163. 
114. Id. at 112. 
115. Id. at 168.  
116. Id. at 163. 
117. Id. at 166.  
118. Pew Res. Ctr. What the Data Says About Gun Deaths in the U.S., (Aug. 
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/16/what-the-data-says-about-gun-
deaths-in-the-u-s/. 
119. § 7901. Findings; purposes, 15 U.S.C.A. §7901(a)(4) (Westlaw though 
P.L. 116-158) 
120. Id. at §7901(b)(1) 
121. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 421 F. 
Supp. 2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  
122. Id. at 1211. 
123. Id. at 1212. 
124. Id. at 1213. 
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the cause of a public nuisance if said products “unreasonably interfere with 
a right common to the general public.”125  However, on remand, the district 
court dismissed Ileto’s claim and held that legislative intent would not 
permit recovery on public nuisance grounds.126  
 A similar conclusion was reached in the City of Philadelphia v. 
Baretta U.S.A. Corp, where the City of Philadelphia sued gun 
manufacturers on public nuisance grounds, alleging that the use of 
defendants’ products by criminals resulted in an increased cost to protecting 
the public.127  First, the court noted that no prior New Jersey court had held 
lawful activities in commerce to be a public nuisance.128  Furthermore, 
public rights were typically limited to “interference connected with real 
property or infringement of public rights.”129  Moreover, the court found 
that the causal connection between an increased cost in preventing crime 
and the manufacturing was too attenuated to hold the defendants liable 
because they had no direct control over the firearms.130  Thus, the court 
ultimately declined to extend New Jersey law and chose not to hold a 
firearm manufacturer legal for harm caused indirectly by defendants.131  
In Young v. Bryce Arms, on a motion for summary judgment, the 
court reached comparable conclusions as in the City of Philadelphia and 
Ileto.132  Ultimately, the court dismissed claims against gun manufacturers, 
which alleged that they created a public nuisance by selling firearms that 
were used in furtherance of criminal activities.133  In Young, five plaintiffs 
comprised of family members and estate administrators sued firearm 
manufacturers and retailers for the death of individuals who died at the hand 
of illegal firearms.134  The plaintiffs premised their claim on manufacturers 
intentionally selling firearms to juvenile gang members.135  The court held 
that defendants manufacturing and selling of firearms constituted a public 
right because individuals have a public right to be safe in public.136  
Notably, the plaintiffs failed to raise any violations of federal or state laws 
 
125. Id. at 1214 (quoting Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 
1142 (Ohio 2002)). 
126. Ileto, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.  
127. City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd Cir. 
2002). 
128. Id. at 421.  
129. Id. at 420 (citing W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 86 at 
616-18 (5th ed. 1984)).   
130. Id. at 422.  
131. Id.  
132. Young v. Bryco Arms, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1091 (Ill. 2004).   
133. Id. at 1082. 
134. Id. at 1080.  
135. Id. at 1082. 
136. Id. at 1084.  
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concerning the manufacturing, marketing, or selling of firearms.137  The 
court stated that when an injury occurs in a highly regulated industry, so 
long as the defendant is not intentionally negligent, then the defendant will 
not be liable under the doctrine of public nuisance.138  Ultimately, the court 
reasoned that reliance should be placed on the legislature in public nuisance 
cases for manufactured products in heavily regulated industries.139  Lastly, 
the court concluded that even if there was a public right, the defendants 
were not the direct and proximate cause of the injury.140  
In contrast, in the City of Gary Ex Rel. King v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., plaintiffs complaint survived defendants motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.141  The plaintiffs brought a claim for public 
nuisance, alleging the defendants negligently marketed and sold firearms 
that ended up in the hands up criminals, which, as a result, lead to an 
increased cost in protecting the public.142  The court reasoned that 
defendants’ negligent conduct, when applied to the doctrine of public 
nuisance, might lead a jury to conclude that there was unreasonable 
interference with the public right to health and safety.143  The court denied 
the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because, on the face of the 
complaint, plaintiffs had pleaded enough to prove that a duty existed and 
that said duty had been breached.144  In determining whether a duty existed, 
the court “balance[ed] … foreseeability, public policy, and the relationship 
between the parties.145  Therefore, a jury might conclude that a public right 
was violated when the defendant breached their duty.146  
In N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., the plaintiffs brought suit against 
gun manufacturers, alleging that a public nuisance arose from gun 
manufacturers’ failure to limit the sale of guns and deter firearm 
violence.147  The plaintiffs claim that their public right to health and safety 
were injured due to the misuse of firearms.148  The court was unpersuaded 
by this argument and held that the harm suffered by plaintiffs was no 
 
137. Id. at 1085.   
138. Id. at 1084.  
139. Id. at 1091. 
140. Id.   
141. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 
1249 (Ind. 2003). 
142. Id. at 1228. 
143. Id. at 1248.  
144. Id. at 1242. 
145. Id.   
146. Id. at 1248. 
147. N.A.A.C.P. v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 2d 435, 446-47 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003).  
148. Id. at 508.  
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different from that of the general public.149  In order to show harm under 
the doctrine of public nuisance, a plaintiff must show that they have 
suffered a “particular harm not shared in common with the rest of the 
public.”150  Harm different in kind does not mean severity or degree of 
harm.151  Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to allege a harm different in kind 
because the police and New York government owe all residents the same 
duty of protection and safety.152  
In the City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp, Chicago sued firearm 
manufacturers for costs associated with gun violence.153  According to the 
court, Chicago failed to recognize a public right to general safety because 
“any dangerous instrumentality in the community could … threaten” a 
public right.154  The court further stated that “a public right is ‘not like the 
individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted.’”155  Therefore, 
Chicago’s action for public nuisance cannot be maintained.156 
4. Public Nuisance: Pharmaceutical Industry  
 In 2017, the pharmaceutical industry was worth over $900 
billion.157  The pharmaceutical industry is also heavily regulated at the 
federal and state level.158  Even with such regulation, opioid deaths have 
been on an accelerating rise since the 1990s.159   
In Labzda v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs brought an 
action against Purdue Pharmaceuticals, alleging that the wrongful death of 
their son was due to a public nuisance created by Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals.160  Before the death of the plaintiffs’ son, he was 
prescribed opioids for chronic pain management.161  A few years later, their 
 
149. Id. at 499.  
150. Id. at 497 (citing Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N.Y. 360, 370 (N.Y. 1887)). 
151. Id. at 489 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN 
RECOVER FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(C) cmt. h. (Am. Law Inst. 1979)). 
152. Id. at 499.   
153. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (Ill. 
2004).  
154. Id. at 1116. 
155. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B) 
cmt., g).  
156. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d at 1148. 
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THE BUSINESS RESEARCH COMPANY, (May 2018), https://blog.marketresearch.com/the-
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158. Charles L. Hooper, Pharmaceuticals: Economics and Regulation, 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PharmaceuticalsEconomicsandRegulation.html.  
159. Opioid Data Analysis and Resources, CDC (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html. 
160. Labzda v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 
2003). 
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son overdosed.162  First, the court held that pharmaceutical manufacturers 
are not liable for the actions of prescribing physicians.163  In addition, the 
plaintiffs’ son willfully took drugs after being repeatedly warned of the 
dangers.164  As a result, Purdue Pharmaceutical was not the proximate cause 
of the plaintiffs’ son’s death.165  Thus, the court dismissed the lawsuit.166  
In Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, twenty Arkansas counties brought 
public nuisance claims against methamphetamine manufacturers.167  The 
plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ created a public nuisance by 
manufacturing cold and allergy medication that they knew was being 
illegally synthesized into methamphetamine, and therefore increasing the 
societal cost of addiction treatment.168  The court held that there were no 
intervening causes leading to the increased societal cost of addiction 
treatment and were not the direct result of the defendants actions.169  
Therefore, there can be no claim for nuisance.170  
 Since 2018, more than half of the United States have filed lawsuits 
against drug manufacturers for deceptive marketing strategies or on public 
nuisance grounds.171  The instant case, the State of Oklahoma v. Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals, is important because the plaintiff argued that defendants’ 
false and misleading marketing tactics lead to the opioid epidemic.172  
Unlike typical product liability theories, the plaintiffs do not argue that the 
products were defective.  Instead, they argued that defendants conduct 
increased rates of addiction and increased costs associated with treating 
addiction.173  
 The following section will discuss the procedural history, facts, and 
holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical. Subsequently, this Comment 
will analyze the facts in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. This Comment will then compare the facts 
and holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals with similar cases 
regarding product liability.  Thereafter, this Comment will discuss the 
possible reasonings that might have been behind the judgment.  Lastly, this 
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168. Id. at 662-63.  
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Comment will provide a summary of possible consequences that may occur 
as a result of the extension.  
 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS OF STATE V. PURDUE 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
This suit was brought in the District Court of Cleveland County in 
Oklahoma by the Attorney General of Oklahoma on behalf of the State of 
Oklahoma on June 30th, 2017, against drug manufacturers, their 
subsidiaries, sister corporations, agents, and principals. 174  The defendants 
included Purdue Pharmaceutical L.P., Purdue Pharmaceutical, Inc., Purdue 
Frederick Company, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Cephalon, Inc., 
Johnson & Johnson, Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 
Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, Actavis LLC, and Watson 
Laboratories, Inc.175  
Oklahoma reached a settlement agreement with Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals, L.P., Purdue Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Purdue Frederick 
Company Inc. on March 26th, 2019.176  Furthermore, on June 7th, 2019, a 
second settlement was entered between Oklahoma and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.177  
On August 26th, 2019, the District Court of Cleveland County 
rendered a judgment in favor of Oklahoma, against the remaining 
defendants Cephalon, Inc., Johnson & Johnson, Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, 
Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., Jannsen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Actavis PLC, 
Actavis LLC, and Watson Laboratories, Inc. for $572,102,028.178    
 
B. Factual Summary 
 
 The State of Oklahoma is currently experiencing an opioid 
epidemic.179  Oklahoma began experiencing issues from a rising opioid 
epidemic during the mid-1990s.180  Throughout the 1990s, defendants 
promoted, manufactured, and sold opioid-based drugs such as Duragesic, 
Ultram, Ultram Extended Release, Ultracet, Nucynta, Nucynta Extended 
 
174. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1. 
175. Id. 
176. Settlement Agreement, State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 
2019 WL 4059721 (Dist. Ct. Okla. 2019). 
177. Id. 
178. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *20. 
179. Id. at 2. 
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Release, Tylenol with Codeine, and Tylox.181  As part of a pain 
management scheme, defendants’ opioid-based drugs were said to treat 
chronic and non-chronic pain without discussing the risk of addiction.182  
The overall purpose of the defendants’ pain management scheme was to 
increase revenue.183  
For example, in support of the defendants’ pain management 
scheme, in 1980, Johnson & Johnson obtained and formed two subsidiaries 
to secure the supply of the necessary ingredients to produce opioid-based 
drugs.184  Those subsidiaries, Noramco and Tasmanian Alkaloids, became 
the “number #1 supplier of Narcotic APIs in the United States, the world’s 
largest market.”185  However, in 2016, Johnson & Johnson sold those two 
subsidiaries used in manufacturing materials for opioids.186   
Defendants targeted individuals with chronic cancer pain and 
chronic non-cancer pain.187  In promoting their pain management schemes, 
defendants publicized the low risk of opioid addiction and, simultaneously, 
claimed that pain was undertreated and harmful.188  Defendants partook in 
branded and unbranded marketing techniques.189  The defendants focused 
their efforts on government agencies, doctors, and the general public.190  
The ultimate goal was to increase the sale of opioid-based drugs.191  
Defendants’ advertised their opioid-based drugs to Oklahoma 
residents through websites and brochures.192  Defendants’ strategies also 
included marketing tactics that discussed the harm of chronic pain on 
patients, the prevalence of chronic pain, and the likelihood that acute pain 
would turn into chronic pain if untreated.193  For example, “Prescribe 
Responsibly” was a website designed to increase the number of opioid 
prescriptions alleging, that additional prescriptions were the solution to 
pseudo-addiction.194  Brochures further promoted opioid prescriptions as a 
solution to avoid possible negative consequences of undertreated chronic 
pain.195  Furthermore, defendants gave coupons and sample vouchers to 
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patients that were prescribed opioid-based drugs in an attempt to increase 
sales.196  
To incentivize doctors to prescribe more opioid-based drugs, 
defendants funded research articles, funded medical programs to continue 
education, funded speaking engagements, and had their pharmaceutical 
sales representative educate medical professionals.197  Moreover, they held 
seminars, dinners, symposiums, and conferences.198  Defendants intended 
for doctors to widely prescribe opioids for any area of “chronic pain [that] 
was undertreated.”199  For example, in 1996, a “Consensus Statement” was 
issued by two pain advocacy groups funded by the defendants.200  The 
majority of the committee involved in drafting the consensus on opioids 
had personal ties with the defendants.201  The report described government 
regulation and addiction as barriers to the use of opioids.202  The report 
furthered the idea that pain was undertreated and must be resolved.203  The 
“Consensus Statement” was repeatedly used in marketing and sales by 
defendants.204 
Pharmaceutical representatives were told by defendants to avoid 
any negative phrasing when it came to promoting opioids.205  These 
representatives also promoted a “study from Dr. Portenoy” that encouraged 
doctors to prescribe more opioids.206  Moreover, sales representatives 
alleged that opioids prescribed by physicians were less addictive than 
opioids by other means.207  Pharmaceutical representatives emphasized the 
undertreatment of acute pain as an additional means to increase 
prescriptions.208  The defendants, in no way, attempted to educate their 
pharmaceutical representatives as to addiction, addiction to opioids, or the 
opioid epidemic.209  The report included research funded by defendants.210 
Even if patients experienced signs of addiction, defendants 
convinced doctors that patients were experiencing “pseudo-addiction” and 
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should prescribe more.211  Patients labeled with pseudo-addiction typically 
requested a dosage increase or refills before their script “should have run 
out.”212  In support, defendants’ sales representatives cited a study by Allan, 
Simpson, and Milligan, which was later found to be “false and 
misleading.”213  
In 2001, defendants deliberately ignored a recommendation by one 
of their scientists to halt misleading marketing strategies when it came to 
promoting opioids and their likelihood of addiction.214  In addition, their 
scientist informed them that no data supported their claims as to the low 
risk of addiction and abuse.215 
 In 2004, the FDA informed defendants that the information 
conveyed concerning Duragesic was false and misleading when it came to 
the probability of addiction and abuse.216  The FDA was unable to find any 
evidence or data in support of the defendants’ claim that Duragesic was not 
addictive nor likely to be abused.217  The FDA ordered defendants to stop 
all false or misleading marketing techniques as to Duragesic due to a 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §352(a).218  The FDA further ordered that all 
marketing techniques used for Duragesic must comply with federal 
regulations.219 
Doctors alleged that defendants marketing strategies led them to 
prescribe excessive amounts of opioids.220  Moreover, some doctors even 
faced criminal prosecution due to the volume of opioids prescribed to 
patients.221 
 The increase in opioid prescriptions increased opioid-related deaths 
in Oklahoma.222  In addition to opioid overdoses, the state of Oklahoma 
experienced an increase in “opioid use disorder, the rise in NAS, and 






211. Id. at 5. 
212. Id.  
213. Id. at 6. 
214. Id. at 8. 
215. Id.  
216. Id. at 9. 
217. Id.  
218. Id.  
219. Id.  
220. Id. at 9-11. 
221. Id. at 9. 
222. Id. at 9-11 
223. Id. at 10. 
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C. Court’s Analysis 
 
Oklahoma argued that the defendants’ intentional false and 
misleading dissemination of opioid prescriptions constituted a public 
nuisance under Okla. Stat. Tit. 50 §1.224  Oklahoma alleged that the number 
of opioid prescriptions increased based on defendants’ manufacturing, 
promoting, and selling of opioid-based drugs.225  The alleged injury was the 
increased societal costs in providing healthcare and other government 
associated services that pertain to enforcement and treatment of opioid 
addiction.226  Defendants, on the other hand, claimed that the plaintiff did 
not meet their burden of proof required by public nuisance.227  However, 
defendants conceded that their advertising campaign was false and 
misleading.228  
The Court opined that because “the defendants’ false, misleading, 
and dangerous marketing campaign caused exponentially increasing rates 
of addiction, overdose deaths, and Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, I [the 
Court] conclude these are unlawful acts which ‘annoys, injures, or 
endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others.’”229  The court 
ultimately held that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the 
defendants did, in fact, cause a public nuisance.230   
In Oklahoma, under 50 O.S. 1981 § 1, a nuisance consists in 
unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which act or 
omission either:  
First. Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, 
health or safety of others; or  
Second. Offends decency; or  
Third. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to 
obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any lake or 
navigable river, stream, canal or basin, or any public park, 
square, street or highway; or 
Fourth. In any way renders other persons insecure in life, or 
in the use of property, provided, this section shall not apply 
to preexisting agricultural activities.231  
 
 
224. Id. at 1. 
225. Id. at 9-11. 
226. Id. at 15-21. 
227. Id. at 1. 
228. Id. at 12. 
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 11-12. 
231. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 8 (West 2020). 
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According to 50 O.S. § 2, a public nuisance “is one which affects at the 
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable 
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage 
inflicted upon the individuals may be unequal.”232   
The actions committed by the defendants included their “false, 
misleading, and dangerous marketing campaigns.” 233  In addition, these 
actions “… annoy[ed], injure[d], or endanger[ed] the comfort, repose, 
health, or safety of others.”234  Defendants’ marketing techniques 
specifically increased “rates of addiction, overdose deaths, and Neonatal 
Abstinence Syndrome.”235  
The Court further found that defendants’ conduct was the cause in 
fact of the injuries suffered by Oklahoma and its residents.236  Furthermore, 
the defendants willfully understated the consequences of opioid-based 
drugs, broadened product distribution, took data out of context, and actively 
promoted opioid-based medication in contrast to company policy. 237 
In addition, the District Court concluded that the doctrine of public 
nuisance extends to claims outside of those that include real property and 
now to those of corporate activity.238  In the instant case, corporate activity 
by the defendants includes the use of “real and personal property, private 
and public, as well as the public roads, buildings and land of the State of 
Oklahoma, to create this nuisance.”239  In support of this conclusion, the 
District Court cited an Oklahoma Supreme Court case that further extended 
nuisance to conduct which infringes upon the just rights of an individual.240  
In Oklahoma, a supervening cause may mitigate the liability of a 
defendant in an action for public nuisance.241  If there were any acts or 
omissions by the plaintiff that directly or even proximately contributed to 
the public nuisance by the defendant, then the defendants actions would not 
be the proximate cause of the nuisance.242  A supervening cause requires 
that the new cause be “(1) independent of the original act, (2) adequate of 
 
232. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020). But 
see OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 50, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Sept 1, 2020) (providing that 
any activity expressly permitted by a statute does not constitute a public nuisance, and 
potentially rendering the entire holding invalid because defendants met all statutory 
requirements regarding the sale and distribution of their opioid-based drugs).  
233. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12. 
234. Id.  
235. Id.  
236. Id. at 11. 
237. Id.  
238. Id.  
239. Id.  
240. Id. at 11 (citing Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36 (Okla. 1985)). 
241. Id. at 14. 
242. Id.  
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itself to bring about the result and (3) one whose occurrence was not 
reasonably foreseeable to the original actor.”243  The Court further found 
that there were no supervening causes to mitigate the defendants’ 




In Oklahoma, a plaintiff may seek an indictment, information, a 
civil action, or abatement as remedies for a nuisance.245   However, 
indictment or information may only be sought where criminal charges or 
punishment are brought against a defendant for public nuisance.246   If the 
plaintiff is a public body or authorized by law, then they may bring suit to 
abate a nuisance.247   In addition, cities, towns, and counties may similarly 
abate a nuisance under Oklahoma law.248   
The relief sought by the state was for an abatement of the 
nuisance.249  The court held that abatement of the nuisance was reasonable 
and necessary as a proper remedy for the injury suffered by the plaintiffs.250  
The breakdown of costs is as follows:  
Program Yearly Cost 
Opioid Disorder Prevention and Treatment 
Programs 
$232,947,710251 
Supplementary Addiction Programs $31,796,011252 
Public Medication and Disposal Programs $139,883253 
Universal Screening Programs $56,857,054254 
Pain Prevention and Non-Opioid Pain 
Management Programs  
$103,277,835255 
Naloxone Distribution and Overdose 
Prevention Education 
$1,585,797256 
Patient Management and Consultations $3,953,832257 
 
243. Id. at 14 (quoting Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 348 (Okla. 1993)).  
244. Id. at 14.  
245. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 8 (West 2020). 
246. Id. § 9 (West 2020). 
247. Id. § 11 (West 2020), 
248. Id. § 16 (West 2020); Id. 2020 § 20 (West 2020). 
249. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1. 
250. Id. at 15. 
251. Id. at 15-16. 
252. Id. at 16. 
253. Id.  
254. Id.  
255. Id.  
256. Id. at 17. 
257. Id.  
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Continuing Education for Doctors to Deal 
with Neonatal AS  
$107,683,000258 
Hospital Funding for NAS Programs, 
Treatment, and Equipment 
$181,983259 
Prenatal Opioid Screening Program $1,969,000260 
Infant Withdrawal Program  $20,608,847261 
Law Enforcement Regulation, Enforcement 
and Investigation 
$11,101,076262 
Total Amount That Defendants are Liable 
For:  




The analysis section, in this Comment, will apply the facts in State 
v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals to the doctrine of public nuisance under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Although not binding, restatements are 
helpful compilations of common law rules and trends from courts across 
the country.264  Furthermore, this section will demonstrate, in detail, how 
the Judge reached his conclusion, but how his conclusion was incorrect.  
First, the Judge incorrectly identified a public right. Second, even if a public 
right did exist, the Judge disregarded the proximate cause requirement, 
which would have mitigated liability. Therefore, the judgment should be 
reversed.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following 
criteria for public nuisance:  
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a 
right common to the general public.  
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an 
interference with a right is unreasonable include the 
following:  
(a) whether the conduct involves a 
significant interference with the public 
health, safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or  
 
258. Id.  
259. Id. at 17-18. 
260. Id. at 18. 
261. Id.  
262. Id. at 18-20. 
263. Id. at 20. 
264. About the ALI, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (date accessed Nov. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ali.org/about-ali/. 
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(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a 
statute, ordinance or administrative 
regulation, or  
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing 
nature or has produced a permanent or long-
lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has 
reason to know, has a significant effect upon 
the public right.265  
To have standing for public nuisance, the individual must have “suffered 
harm different in kind” than that by other members of the public.266 
 First, this section will determine whether the plaintiffs have 
standing to sue.  Second, this section will determine whether a public right 
exists to be free from opioid addiction.  Third, this section will determine 
whether the defendants’ conduct of manufacturing, marketing, and selling 
opioid-based drugs substantially and unreasonably interfered with a public 
right.  Fifth, this section will discuss whether defendants were the 
proximate cause of the alleged injury.  Lastly, this section will discuss any 
defenses that might mitigate or negate liability.  
 
A. Oklahoma had standing to bring this action against defendants. 
 
According to the Second Restatement of Torts, an individual must 
have standing to recover for injuries sustained by a public nuisance.267  
Standing requires that the injury suffered must be “of a kind different from 
that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common 
to the general public that was the subject of interference.” 268  In determining 
if injury is different in kind, the court may consider the degree of 
interference experienced by the plaintiff(s).269  The harm suffered as a result 
of the nuisance may be physical, monetary, an inconvenience, or difficulty 
in exercising a right to that specific individual.270  Furthermore, private 
 
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979).  
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC 
NUISANCE § 821(C). 
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC 
NUISANCE § 821(C) cmt. c. 
268. Id.; see also Anon., Y.B. Mich., 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (Eng.); see 
Diamond, 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377; see also Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, 1212.  
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHO CAN RECOVER FOR PUBLIC 
NUISANCE § 821(C). 
270. Id. 
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individuals or statutorily approved government entities or officials may 
bring suits for public nuisance.271  
 In Oklahoma, due to the opioid epidemic, the general public 
experienced increased deaths, addiction, crime, and costs.272  However, the 
injury suffered by the state of Oklahoma included the increased costs of 
providing healthcare, law enforcement, and other government services 
associated with the implementation, enforcement, and treatment.273  
Therefore, the harm suffered by the government was different in kind than 
that suffered by the general public. Both the general public and the 
government experienced harm due to the opioid epidemic. However, the 
bulk of the harm from the costs associated with managing the epidemic fell 
on the government.274  Thus, the government, under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, had standing to bring this public nuisance action.  
A public nuisance merely requires the opportunity to harm or impact 
an individual in society.275  The injury suffered must occur during the 
exercise of a public right.276  Thus, although the public nuisance has a 
possibility to impact everyone in the general public, it may only injure those 
that exercise their public right.277  
 In the instant case, the injury suffered by the State of Oklahoma was 
pecuniary.278  Funds expended for health care, enforcement, and treatment 
are associated with the opioid epidemic in Oklahoma.279  Therefore, the 
government suffered harm in exercising their public right.  Thus, the 
government, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, had standing to bring 
this public nuisance action. 
 
B. Oklahoma does not have a public right of health and safety to be 
addiction free. 
 
Under the doctrine of public nuisance, the injury must occur while 
exercising a public right.280  “A public right is one common to all members 
of the general public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual 
 
271. Id. 
272. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12. 
273. Id. at 15-21. 
274. Id. 
275. State v. Lead Indus., Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d 428, 447-48 (R.I. 2008). 
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. g 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
277. Id. at cmt. g. 
278. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21. 
279. Id. 
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979).  
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right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or 
negligently injured.”281  However, statutory construction may waive the 
strict public right requirement if the statute specifies that interference only 
needs to be with “any considerable number of persons.”282  Although not 
exhaustive, the Second Restatement of Torts identifies the public rights to 
health, safety, morals, peace, and convenience are all public rights.283  
Furthermore, a statutes may also dictate public rights.284 
 Many judges, scholars, and legal experts struggle in determining 
public rights. There are two approaches, one narrow and one broad. In 
general, a public right is ‘not like the individual right that everyone has not 
to be assaulted.’”285  In 2008, the supreme court of Rhode Island suggested 
that to satisfy the requirement of a public right, the plaintiff must provide 
more than a general interference with “health, safety, peace, comfort or 
convenience.”286  It has been further suggested by law review articles that 
there are no public rights to “standards of living … holding a job … and 
there is no common law public right to a certain standard of medical care 
or housing.”287  In contrast, the broad interpretation of a public right like in 
ConAgra, the California appeals court held that a public right only requires 
a societal interest.288  In Young, the court furthered the broad interpretation 
of public right to imply that individuals on public property have an in 
general right to public safety.289 
According to the Court, defendants participated in unlawful acts that 
lead to increased addiction and death within Oklahoma communities.290  
However, in making this statement, the judge failed to identify the issue at 
hand.  The judge failed to accurately determine the public right. The opinion 
identified the defendants’ conduct and then concluded that there was harm 
to public health. The true issue at hand is whether Oklahoma has a public 
right to be free from addiction, not whether there was harm.  
 
281. Id. at cmt. g. 
282. Id.  
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. b 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
284. Id. at cmt. c. 
285. Lead Industries, 951 A.2d 428, 543-4 (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Torts: Public Nuisance § 821 (B) cmt. e). State v. Lead Indus., Ass’n, Inc., 951 A. 2d 
428, 436-37 (R.I. 2008). 
286. Id. at 543-44. 
287. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003).   
288. People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 112 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2017) 
289. Young, 812 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084.  
290. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *12. 
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Under a narrow interpretation, a court would likely conclude that 
there is no public right to be free from addiction.  The right to be free from 
addiction seems analogous to the private right to not be assaulted.  
Moreover, the right to be free from addiction is comparable to the absence 
of a public right to specific standards of living.  In contrast, under a broad 
interpretation of a public right, a court would likely conclude that the 
general public has a societal interest in being free from addiction.  
Furthermore, under a broad interpretation, a court might elaborate on the 
impact of addiction to a community and the harm to public property because 
most addicts will increase the number of those homeless and, thereafter, 
live on public property.  
The dilemma faced by each court is whether to take the narrow or 
broad definition of a public right.  A court, in making this determination, 
should consider precedence, public policy, legislative enactments, and 
legislative intent.  If courts were to expand the definition of public right, 
this could lead to a public right organic food. Where all farmers or food 
manufacturers are liable for using any chemicals on their food that have the 
potential to harm individuals. The idea of a public right could be further 
extended to blame food manufacturers or even private individuals for 
increased healthcare costs that society incurs as a result. Without 
limitations, this extension could allow a public right to be anything that 
harms society. Alternatively, the expansion of a public right might lead to 
more vigilant product safety measures and more consumer-minded 
businesses.  If a statute expressly identifies a public right to be addiction-
free, then the court should defer to the legislature.  In addition, if legislature 
enacted substance abuse preventative measures, legislative intent may also 
include comments on a public right to being addiction free. In the instant 
case, Oklahoma prohibits all legal activities from being held a public 
nuisance, suggesting a hesitancy to hold companies liable for activities 
conducted legally.291  Further, there are federal and state statutes regulating 
the sale, production, marketing, and use of pharmaceuticals. Indicating 
strong legislative policy interests. In addition, there are consumer 
protection laws established by the legislature to protect individuals from 
injuries that arise. Therefore, a narrow interpretation would more closely 
align with statutory intent, public policy, and current statutes.  
The definition of public rights should not be expanded to include a 
right to be free from addiction.  Although addiction impacts an entire 
community, the right to be addiction-free is private.  In addition, if the 
 
291. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2020) 
(providing that any activity expressly permitted by a statute does not constitute a public 
nuisance and potentially rendering the entire holding invalid because defendants met all 
statutory requirements regarding the sale and distribution of their opioid-based drugs). 
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definition of public rights were to expand, courts will see a flood of 
litigation concerning new potential public rights.  An individual might 
assert a claim for public nuisance alleging harm to a public right solely 
because a third party used an item, outside of its intended use, and harmed 
them.  Lastly, the pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated. 
Pharmaceutical companies must meet and maintain state and federal 
requirements for all marketing, manufacturing, and selling.292  If the 
legislature had intended to identify a public right in such statutes, they 
would have done so.  
In conclusion, there is no public right to be addiction free. However, 
the restatement suggests that even in the absence of a public right, statutory 
construction may still permit an action under the doctrine of public 
nuisance.293  In the instant case, under 50 O.S. 1981 § 2, there need not be 
a public right due to the broad language in the statute.294  Therefore, if a 
court were to choose the broad definition of public right or if the state has 
broad statutory language that forgives the public right requirement, then we 
must determine if there was unreasonable and significant interference with 
the public right to health and safety.  
 
C. Defendants unintentionally and unreasonably interfered with 
Oklahoma and its citizen’s public right. 
 
Once a public right or an exception has been established, the 
doctrine of public nuisance requires that interference with the public right 
to be unreasonable and significant.295  Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, although not conclusive, the court may consider these instances as 
unreasonable:  
 (a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference 
with the public health, safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort or the public convenience, or  
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance 
or administrative regulation, or  
 
292. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West, 2018); 21 
U.S.C.A. § 825 (West, 2018). 
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am Law. Inst. 1979). 
294. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 2 (West). The broad language of this statute 
implies that the judge was correct in concluding that a public right exists. However, 
under my analysis from existing case law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a 
different conclusion is reached. However, his extension of public right was plausible.   
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F). 
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(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has 
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the 
actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect 
upon the public right.296  
Unreasonable interference may either be intentional or unintentional 
actions by the defendant.297  Both intentional and unintentional interference 
requires either action or inaction by the defendants.298  Therefore, to 
determine if interference was unreasonable, we must determine if the 
defendants conduct interfered with a public right and then whether such 
interference was significant.  
 
1. Defendants unintentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to 
health and safety.  
 
The issue at hand is whether the defendants’ actions of 
manufacturing, selling, and promoting opioid-based drugs unreasonably 
and significantly interfered with the public right to health and safety of 
being addiction-free.299  First, we must consider whether the defendants 
intentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to health and safety 
to be addiction free.  If we find that defendants’ interference was not 
intentional, then we must determine if their conduct unintentionally 
interfered with the public right.300  Lastly, if we find that defendants 
interfered unintentionally or intentionally with a public right to be 
addiction-free, then we must consider if the interference was reasonable.  
 
A. Defendants did not intentionally interfere with Oklahoma public 
right to be addiction-free.  
 
Any intentional interference with a public right is unreasonable.301  
When a tortfeasor acts intentionally to interfere with an individual’s public 
right or if there is a high probability of interference, then the tortfeasor’s 
actions are unreasonable.302  However, even if a tortfeasor’s actions are 
 
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979).  
297. Id. at cmt. e.  
298. Id.  
299. Recall that this article ultimately concludes that there is no public right to 
be addiction-free. This section merely discusses the exception or a broad interpretation.    
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
301. Id. at cmt. e.  
302. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL INVASION – WHAT 
CONSTITUTES § 825.  
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intentional, then the court must consider the potential benefits, costs, and 
harms associated with those actions.303  
In AcuSport, the court stated that intentional conduct that interferes 
with a public right requires more than a “general awareness” or knowledge 
that harm may occur or that there are potential risks involved with their 
conduct.304  Intent requires that the manufacturer “knows or is substantially 
certain that its marketing practices have a significant impact on the 
likelihood that” opioid-based drugs will result in “substantial harm to the 
public” through addiction and costs therein associated.305  However, once 
an individual becomes aware that they are affecting a public right and 
makes no effort to change their conduct, then they will have intentionally 
interfered with the public right.306 
 The facts of the case make no indication that the defendants 
intended for the sale, promotion, or manufacturing of opioid-based drugs to 
increase costs and death associated with addiction to their products.  
According to the facts, the purpose was to generate revenue.307   
However, two instances might indicate that defendants’ actions 
intentionally interfered with the public right to be addiction-free because 
there might have been a high probability of interference.  First, in 2001, 
defendants ignored a recommendation to halt misleading marketing 
strategies regarding opioid-based drugs.308  Second, in 2004, the FDA 
informed the defendants that they were spreading false and misleading 
information concerning the likelihood of addiction and abuse of 
Duragesic.309  These two instances are examples of conduct that could have 
lead defendants to believe their marketing strategy was false and 
misleading, resulting in an increase in addiction and costs associated with 
addiction.  Conversely, defendants may have known that their marketing 
strategies were false and misleading but not have foreseen the consequence 
of harm to the health and safety of society.  Under the facts of the instant 
case, the main focus of defendants was profit-oriented and not focused on 
externalities.  Therefore, although a court might find that defendants 
intentionally interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to health and safety, 
it is unlikely that they would.   
 
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1979); See Also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g; 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: UNREASONABLENESS OF INTENTIONAL 
INVASION § 826.  
304. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 488.  
305. Id. 
306. Id. 
307. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *4. 
308. Id. at 8. 
309. Id. at 9. 
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In conclusion, the defendants did not intentionally interfere with a 
public right to be addiction free.  Consequently, we must consider if 
defendants’ actions unintentionally interfered with a public right to be 
addiction free.  
 
B. Defendants’ unintentionally and negligently interfered with 
Oklahoma’s public right to be addiction-free health.  
 
In contrast to intentional interference, if the action that harms a 
public right was unintentional, then the court will consider if the 
interference was due to other actionable torts, such as negligence or 
recklessness.310  Therefore, we must determine if the defendants’ actions of 
promoting, selling, and manufacturing opioid-based drugs unintentionally 
interfered with a public right.  
A court may find that a tortfeasor interfered with a public right if 
the harm resulted from unintentionally negligent conduct.311  Negligence is 
“the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation.”312  According to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, an individual is negligent if they act or fail 
to act regarding a duty and said action or inaction falls below a reasonable 
standard of care designed to protect others from an unreasonable risk of 
harm.313  Furthermore, a defendant may be negligent for failing to warn an 
individual of the potential harm.314  
(a) a defendant whose conduct creates a risk of physical or 
emotional harm can fail to exercise reasonable care by 
failing to warn of the danger if:  
(1) the defendant knows or has reason to 
know: (a) of that risk; and (b) that those 
encountering the risk will be unaware of it; 
and  
(2) a warning might be effective in reducing 
the risk of harm.  
(b) Even if the defendant adequately warns of the risk that 
the defendant’s conduct creates, the defendant can fail to 
exercise reasonable care by failing to adopt further 
 
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821(B) cmt. e 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
311. Id. 
312. Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
313. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE DEFINED § 282 cmt. a-e. 
(Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
314. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN § 18. 
(Am. Law Inst. 2020). 
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precautions to protect against the risk if it is foreseeable that 
despite the warning some risk of harm remains.315   
Furthermore, an actor may still be negligent for failing to take additional 
precautions, even though they were following those required by statute.316  
 A finding of negligence requires that the defendant owe a duty of 
care to the public and that the defendant breach said public duty by failing 
to maintain a reasonable standard of care.317  Typically, in determining 
whether a duty exists, courts “balance … foreseeability, public policy, and 
the relationship between the parties.318   However, the balancing test is only 
required if the law has not yet established such a duty by law.319  For 
example, in Oklahoma, drug manufacturers only owe a duty to the 
prescriber, which requires disclosure as to the potential side effects or risks 
associated with its use, not to the patient.320  In general, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers owe a duty to warn consumers of potential risks when 
required by the FDA and when other exceptions are carved out by law.321 
However, compliance with  the FDA is not a shield from liability and a mere 
minimum duty.322  Therefore, states may impose heightened duties on 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.323   
First, it is important to note that the court does conclude that doctors 
were misled regarding the prescribing practices of opioid-based 
medications.324  Therefore, that alone would be sufficient to find that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers breached their duty of care.  However, it 
does seem that the judge offered little evidence on the information provided 
to doctors other than pseudo-addiction and false reports.325   
In the instant case, however, it is likely that a duty exists to 
adequately inform all potential purchasers of opioid-based drugs of the risks 
 
315. Id. 
316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: STATUTORY COMPLIANCE § 16. (Am. 
Law Inst. 2010). 
317. AcuSport, 271 F.Supp. 2d at 435, 488. 
318. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp. 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 
1242 (Ind. 2003).  
319. Id.  
320. Edwards, 933 P. 2d 298, 301. 
321. Id. at 301-02.  
322. Id. at 303. 
323. Id. 
324. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *9-11. 
325. In determining if there was a breach of duty, we must first determine 
whether there was a duty.  Therefore, two questions must be considered in determining if 
there was a breach of duty: (1) was there a duty to notify users of the potential risks 
associated with opioid-based drugs and (2) if defendants do owe a duty, was said duty 
breached by failing to exercise reasonable care.  In the instant case, the court held that 
defendants breached their duty to consumers by failing to warn of the risks associated 
with taking opioid-based drugs.  
2021] THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC 67 
associated with their use.  Therefore, any failure to adequately or 
sufficiently warn, especially after being warned by the FDA, would most 
likely be a violation of their duty.  Defendants have a duty, under FDA 
regulations, to properly label information regarding the side effects and 
risks associated with any drug.326  As noted earlier, defendants, in 2001, 
were warned and failed to take adequate precautions associated with the 
risk of opioid-based drugs.327  Therefore, defendants likely had a duty to 
inform both doctors and patients properly of the risks associated with their 
drugs and the act of misleading them was negligent. 
In summary, it is likely that defendants’ actions of manufacturing, 
marketing, and selling opioid-based drugs played a major role and are 
related to the opioid epidemic that resulted.  Their conduct of misleading 
marketing tactics was negligent. Therefore, defendants unintentionally 
interfered with the public right to health and safety.  Once a court has 
established a public right or an exception and that there was interference, 
then the court must consider the significance of the harm.  
 
2. Plaintiffs’ experienced significant harm due to defendants false and 
misleading marketing tactics.  
 
In addition to there being an unreasonable interference with a public 
right, such an interference must be significant.328  Almost all activities can 
interfere, harm, or annoy those in society.329  The significance of the harm 
must be objectively determined considering all relevant factors.330  
The harm associated with opioid-based addiction is not only severe 
in Oklahoma, but around the United States.331  In Oklahoma due to the 
opioid epidemic, the general public experienced increased deaths, 
addiction, crime, and costs.332  The purpose of opioid-based drugs is to help 
individuals manage chronic pain. In the absence of opioids, individuals may 
be stuck with chronic, untreatable pain.  However, opioids are highly 
addictive. Costs associated with addiction impact the individual taking the 
drugs and the community at large.  Due to the high number of alternatives, 
 
326. 21 U.S.C.A. § 825 (West 2018). 
327. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *8. 
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SIGNIFICANT HARM § 821(F). (Am. 
Law Inst. 1979. 
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GENERAL RULE § 822 cmt. g. (Am. 
Law Inst. 1979). 
330. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: GRAVITY OF HARM – FACTORS § 827 
cmt. b. (Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
331. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *2. 
332. Id. at *18. 
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less addictive, pain management techniques, I believe that the costs 
associated with opioid use do not outweigh its benefits.  
Therefore, if an exception to the public right requirement exists, 
then the defendants unreasonably interfered with Oklahoma’s public right 
to be addiction free.  First, defendants unreasonably and unintentionally 
partook in false and misleading marketing which led to the negligent 
prescribing and taking of their products. Second, the harm experienced by 
the entire state was significant.  Nonetheless, even with interference and 
harm, a court, in determining whether defendants can be held liable, must 
determine if they were the proximate cause of the unreasonable interference 
and injuries that resulted.333  
 
D. Defendants were not the proximate cause of Oklahoma’s injury. 
 
 A tortfeasor will only be held liable for injuries to another if their 
conduct was the proximate cause of the injuries.334  The purpose of 
proximate cause is to limit liability to injuries that are foreseeable as a result 
of tortfeasor’s actions.335  The United States Supreme Court suggests that 
“proximate cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is 
administratively possible and convenient.’”336  A defendant is the 
proximate cause of an injury when their actions, “in a natural and 
continuous sequence [resulting from their actions], unbroken by any 
efficient intervening cause, produced the injury, and without which the 
result would not have occurred.”337  “A plaintiff who cannot establish “ 
‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged’ ” fails to plead “a key element for establishing proximate 
causation, independent of and in addition to other traditional elements 
of proximate cause.”338  
 
333. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing Taylor Bay Protective Ass’n v. Adm’r, 
U.S. Ep. P.A., 844 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
334. Id.  
335. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mendoza 
v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).  
336. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (2002) 
(citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of 
Torts § 41 p. 264 (5th ed. 1984)).  
337. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 666 (citing City of Caddo Valley v. George, 9 
S.W.3d 481, 487 (2000)). 
338. Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F. 3d 
229, 235 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. 248, 268-9); see also Philadelphia, 
277 F.3d 415, 423. 
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Proximate cause has been interpreted to include cause in fact and 
legal cause.339 However, an intervening act may shield an individual from 
liability if such an act is “sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury’ and 
the intervening act is ‘totally independent’ of the original act.”340  
 
1. Defendants’ conduct was not the cause in fact of Oklahoma injury.  
 
Cause in fact requires that there be “a reasonable certainty that a 
defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.”341 As put by the Missouri 
supreme court, legal cause turns on whether the “harm is the reasonable and 
probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.”342  Therefore, the 
“alleged harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.”343  
The Ohio supreme court, in Cincinnati, provided factors to consider when 
determining the remoteness of harm from the alleged conduct.344  
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it 
becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's damages 
attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, 
independent, factors. * * * Second, quite apart from 
problems of proving factual causation, recognizing claims 
of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs 
removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, 
to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. * * * And, finally, 
the need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified 
by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since 
directly injured victims can generally be counted on to 
vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any 
of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured 
more remotely.345 
 In the instant case, Oklahoma alleged that their direct harm included 
increased costs of providing healthcare, law enforcement, and other 
government associated services that pertain to implementation, 
 
339. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E. 2d 493, 503); see 
also Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (quoting Chambers, 64 S.W.3d 737, 744; See also Jones, 
155 P.3d 9, 14-5. 
340. City of Caddo Valley, 9 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hill Constr. Co. v. Bragg, 
725 S.W.2d at 540 (1987)) see also Ashley, 552 F.3d at 667. 
341. Young, 812 N.E. 2d 1078, 1085 (citing Lee, 605 N.E.2d 493, 503). 
342. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110, 114.  
343. Id. at 114; See also Jones, 155 P.3d 9, 14-15.  
344. Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1152 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. 258, 269).  
345. Id.  
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enforcement, and treatment.346  Alleging that the defendants’ conduct of 
manufacturing, marketing, and selling opioid-based drugs was the direct 
and proximate cause of the harm suffered.347  Therefore, using the facts of 
the case, a court should consider the sequence of events that lead to the 
harm. 
The sequence of events from manufacturing to the harm is provided 
as follows:  
 
(1) Defendants must receive FDA approval to manufacture 
the medication.348   
(2) Licensed providers place orders with manufacturers to 
receive the medication.349  
(3) Medication is packed and shipped to providers.350 
(4) Medication is received by providers and inventoried.351  
(5) The patient receives treatment by an individual 
authorized to prescribe medication.352  
(6) Although six may coincide with all steps, this event 
represents marketing to doctors and consumers. All 
marketing must be in accordance with FDA guidelines.353  
(7) The patient picks up the prescription.  
(8) The patient takes their medication. Hopefully, patients 
take their medication based on the guidelines provided by 
their doctor.   
(9) The patient becomes addicted to their medication.  
(10) The patient loses their job and become homeless or a 
burden on their family.  
(11) Oklahoma experiences increased costs of providing 
healthcare, law enforcement, and other government 
associated services that pertain to implementation, 
enforcement, and treatment.354   
 
346. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21. 
347. Id. at 11. 
348. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West, 2018); see also, 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West 2018).   
349. Laura Olson, How Does the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Work?, DATEX 
https://www.datexcorp.com/how-does-the-pharmaceutical-supply-chain-work/. (last 
visited Nov. 3. 2020).  
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Brian J. Kenny, Charles V. Preuss, Pharmacy Prescription Requirements, 
STATPEARLS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK538424/; see 
also A Drug Supply Chain Example: From Supplier to Patient, FDA 
https://www.fda.gov/media/81739/download. 
353. 21 U.S.C.A. § 822 (West 2018); see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 823 (West 2018).   
354. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *15-21. 
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According to the above timeline, Oklahoma’s alleged injury is a 
direct result of individuals that become addicted to opioid-based drugs and 
not of the manufacturers.  The injury alleged by Oklahoma is an indirect 
result of their manufacturing, marketing, and selling of opioid-based drugs.  
In contrast, however, private individuals that become addicted would, in 
fact, have a direct injury that resulted from the defendants’ conduct.  
Individuals, in contrast to municipalities, suffer direct harm from the 
marketing and selling of opioid based drugs.  In addition, individuals are 
harmed by the doctors that prescribe the medication and the pharmacists 
that sell it.  
 
2. Defendants’ conduct was not the legal cause of Oklahoma’s injury.  
 
Once cause in fact has been established, a court must determine if 
the defendants’ conduct was the legal cause of the alleged injury by the 
plaintiff.355  In contrast to cause in fact, legal cause “addresses the separate 
issue of how far legal responsibility should extend for a party’s actions.”356  
An individual is the legal cause of harm if their conduct “is a substantial 
factor in producing the injury.”357  According to Young, “the proper inquiry 
regarding legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability, in which we 
ask whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a 
likely result of his conduct.”358 
 In determining whether defendants were the legal cause, it is 
beneficial to determine alternative causes of the alleged addiction.359  
Possible harm may include pill mills, bad doctors, bad pharmacists, theft, 
and misuse of prescribed medication.  According to the opinion, the 
proportion of costs associated with the defendants’ conduct is unknown.  
Moreover, ascertaining the true impact of defendants’ conduct on 
Oklahoma is difficult because there is no other conclusion to make other 
than an increase in costs.  
 As to whether defendants conduct foreseeably caused the opioid 
epidemic, that is unknown.  There were two indications that defendants 
became aware of their deceptive and incorrect marketing techniques.  
 
355. Benjamin Moore, 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (citing Callahan, 863 S.W. 2d 852, 
856).  
356. Ashley, 552 F.3d 659, 667 (citing W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 
41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984)). 
357. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prod. Co., 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 103 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017) (citing Soule v. General Motors Corp, 882 P.2d 298, 311 (Cal.1994)).  
358. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1086 (citing Lee, 605 N.E.2d 493, 503).  
359. Note that a court should also consider all events, other than addiction, that 
may have increased government costs. It is possible that the increased costs are the result 
of multiple events or even events that are unknown.  
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Nonetheless, defendants still maintained their federal and state required 
certifications to continue producing said substances.  Moreover, the doctors 
still had the discretion to prescribe opioid-based drugs.  With the 
burdensome regulations, oversight, and reporting, a reasonable person may 
not have foreseen the consequences.  In hindsight, foreseeability is always 
easy.  However, in the moment, it is a different perspective.  Therefore, it 
is unlikely that defendants could have foreseen the additional costs that the 
government would incur in the event of addicted patients.  In contrast, it is 
likely foreseeable that defendants could have foreseen harm to individuals 
that become addicted.  Therefore, because we are concerned with the harm 
resulting from Oklahoma and not the individual level, the harm was not 
foreseeable.360  
 In conclusion, although it is plausible that defendants’ conduct 
interfered with Oklahoma’s public right to be addiction-free, defendants 
were not the proximate cause of the harm.  Therefore, defendants should 
not be held liable under the doctrine of public nuisance.  
 
V. COMPARING THE JUDGMENTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY WITHIN PUBLIC 
NUISANCE 
 
 When comparing similar cases of product liability under the 
doctrine of public nuisance, the distinctions almost become unnoticeable.  
The court was wrong in holding defendants liable in State v. Purdue 
Pharmaceuticals.  In comparing public nuisance claims that involve 
product liability, it is essential to distinguish the instant case from those in 
the lead paint, cigarette, and firearm industry.  The instant case is 
distinguishable from those against lead paint manufacturers because lead 
paint became illegal before the lawsuits brought against their 
manufacturers. Therefore, the outcomes would likely not be comparable.  
Moreover, the instant case, in contrast to cases against cigarette 
manufacturers, a settlement has yet to be reached.  Thus, the proceeding 
section will analyze the facts and reasonings used in cases brought against 
firearm manufacturers and to conclude as to the possible conclusions that 
each court could reach.   
If a court were to follow the rationale used in Ileto, then defendants, 
in the instant case, would have likely escaped liability. First, the arguments 
 
360. At this point, courts would typically consider defenses that a defendant 
might have to limit liability for the nuisance. In response to a public nuisance suit, a 
defendant may allege that their actions were authorized by law, the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent, the plaintiff assumed the risk, the plaintiff came to the nuisance, 
others contributed to the nuisance or that the injury was a result of an intervening cause. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFENSES § 840 (D) – (E). (Am. Law Inst. 1979).  
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made in Ileto and the instant case were almost identical. The instant case, 
for example, argued that the defendants’ intentional false and misleading 
dissemination of opioid prescriptions constituted a public nuisance under 
Okla. Stat. Tit. 50 §1.361  Similarly, the plaintiffs, in Ileto, argued that 
firearm manufacturers created a public nuisance with their promotion of 
firearms.362  In addition, the harm alleged in both Ileto and the instant case 
included increased costs regarding the health and safety of the public.363  In 
Ileto, the court also found that interference by gun manufacturers 
unreasonably interfered with a public right and that manufacturers were the 
proximate cause of harm.364  However, in contrast to the instant case, the 
manufacturers, in Ileto, were not held liable because their conduct was 
statutorily approved.365  Therefore, if the instant case were to be heard in 
front of the Ileto court, then the judgment would have likely favored 
defendants.  
If the court in Philadelphia were to hear the instant case, then the 
outcome would have likely favored the defendants, but for a different 
reason than in Ileto. Both Philadelphia and the instant case alleged 
increased costs to the health and safety of the public in association with 
government services.366  Although the court would have likely 
acknowledged harm, the court would have found that defendants, in the 
instant case, were not the proximate cause of the injuries alleged.367  
In both Young and in the instant case, the courts would have at least 
agreed that a public right does exist as to health and safety exists.368  
However, the court in Young stated that harm arising from negligence, even 
in a highly regulated industry, is likely to result in liability.369  
Alternatively, the court may take into consideration the legislative intent 
and reach a different conclusion.370 Nonetheless, if the court in Young were 
to have heard the instant case, the conclusion would have likely favored 
 
361. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *1. 
362. Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 421 
F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  
363. Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, 1211, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929 at * 18. 
364. Ileto, 349 F.3d 1191, at 1212-14, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006)  
365. Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1304, dismissed, 421 F.Supp.2d 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  
366. City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd Cir. 
2002); cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929, at *18.  
367. Philadelphia, 277 F. 3d at 422.  
368. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084; cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 4019929 at 12. 
369. Young, 821 N.E. 2d 1078, 1084.  
370. Id. at 1091.  
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defendants because they were not the proximate cause of the harm 
alleged.371 
At least on a motion to dismiss, like that in Gary ex rel. King, the 
court would likely permit the complaint to stand.372  In addition, the harm 
alleged in the instant case and in Gary Ex Rel. King was that harm resulted 
in public health and safety which, in turn, lead to an increased cost in 
government services.373  Therefore, at least on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, the judge would likely not dismiss the case. 
Furthermore, based on the rules stated in this case, a judge might also have, 
similarly, held the defendants in the instant case liable.  
AcuSport, in contrast, argued that manufacturers should have 
limited the sale of firearms.374 Thus, a comparable argument would be that 
defendants should have limited the sale of opioid-based drugs to the public.  
Similarly, the instant case and AcuSport, alleged that harm was to public 
health and safety.375  However, the court would have been unpersuaded by 
this argument.376  The court would likely hold that defendants did not suffer 
harm different in kind than the general public, and therefore, have no 
standing.377  
 Likewise, if the court in Chicago were to hear the instant case, the 
judgment would have likely favored the defendants.  In Chicago, the 
holding elaborated that a public right must be more than the general right 
“not to be assaulted.”378  In the instant case, the judge would have likely 
said that the right to be addiction-free is comparable. Therefore, the judge 
would undoubtedly dismiss Oklahoma’s claim.  
The arguments and the harm alleged in the instant case are far from 
new or novel.  In contrast, numerous cases have alleged harm that resulted 
from the sale of legally manufactured goods that lead to increased costs 
regarding government provided programs.379  In addition, previous courts 
 
371. Id. 
372. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 
1242 (Ind. 2003). 
373. City of Gary ex rel. King, 801 N.E. 2d at 1228; cf. Purdue, 2019 WL 
4019929, at * 18. 
374. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 446-7. 
375. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 508 cf. State of Oklahoma v. Purdue 
Pharmacy, 2019 WL 4019929, at *18. 
376. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 435, 497 (citing Callanan, 107 N.Y. 360, 
370). 
377. Id. 
378. Chicago, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1116 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS: PUBLIC NUISANCE § 821 (B) cmt. g). 
379. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E. 2d 1222, 
1228 (Ind. 2003); City of Philadelphia v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 419 (3rd 
Cir. 2002); Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F. 3d 1191, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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that have heard similar arguments have failed to extend liability to 
manufacturers. Therefore, judges should highly scrutinize the facts of a case 
before attempting to further expand the traditional doctrine of public 
nuisance to those involving product liability.  
 
VI. IN THE MIND OF A JUDGE 
 
The Judge in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals likely believes the 
extension of public nuisance was appropriate under the circumstances.  It 
is clear that the Judge went with a broad definition of a public right and did 
not find an issue concerning a lack of proximate cause. However, in his 
opinion, the Judge disregarded the need to explain his extension of the 
doctrine of public nuisance.   Therefore, it is beneficial to speculate on the 
potential rationale that might have led to the judgment.  
First, regarding the public right to be addiction-free, the Judge 
appears to have logically extended the definition under the doctrine public 
nuisance. This is because the face of the Oklahoma public nuisance statute 
nuisance, where it appears to permit a claim for public nuisance without a 
public right affecting the entire public. However, in doing this the judge 
disregarded possible consequences that could occur due to such a broad 
definition of a public right.  
Moreover, the harm experienced by Oklahoma from opioid-based 
medication was significant from the increased costs, broken families, and 
deaths. Living in Oklahoma, it could be tough to see the pain that occurs 
within the community.  The possible sympathy that arises from seeing 
constant harm could lead a Judge to extend any doctrine of the law to assist 
those harmed where the law was insufficient to remedy a wrong.  
Another possibility is that defendants became a scapegoat for an 
injury that the government played a role in.  The government has approved 
medications, approved drug screening, and regulates the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Therefore, the government is partially responsible for any harm 
that occurs due to a lack of oversight or regulation.  
In conclusion, the change in public perception, the public harm, and 
the inability to remedy the situation under other legal theories, likely lead 
the Judge to the ultimate conclusion in this case.  However, the opinion 
disregards the possible consequences of expanding the doctrine of public 
nuisance to product liability.  Therefore, the proceeding section discusses 





76 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:1 
VII. WHAT NEXT? POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULING IN State v. 
Purdue Pharmaceuticals 
 
The doctrine of public nuisance should be expanded in limited 
instances to product manufacturers.  Here, however, was not the proper 
place for such an expansion. This expansion could have ripple effects across 
the entire legal community. Generally speaking, the expansion of public 
nuisance and a disregard of intervening causes could have disastrous results 
for the doctrine and lead to a multitude of litigations.  The expansion could 
increase the overall number of public nuisance cases filed.  Until the law 
has further developed regarding the expansion, at least in the short term, 
there will likely be an influx of cases brought against product manufacturers 
where other doctrines have traditionally been insufficient.  For example, it 
might be possible to see food manufacturer liable for health consequences 
that impact the entire community through an increased cost of insurance.  
Due to the change in public perception, pharmaceutical companies 
will likely settle similar to that of the tobacco industry.  A settlement could 
decrease overall costs to pharmaceutical companies by limiting damages, 
attorneys’ fees, and future litigations by other states.  With recent trends, a 
settlement would likely be in the best interest of pharmaceutical companies.  
Furthermore, even if courts were to find the defendants not liable, the 
potential costs associated with litigation may outweigh the costs associated 
with a settlement agreement. 
The extension of public nuisance may not hold recourse for private 
members of society that are harmed.  The instant case was a suit brought by 
a municipality and not a private party.  Typically, courts decline class 
actions in public nuisance claims for failure to have harm different than that 
of the general public.  Therefore, if an individual wished to bring a public 
nuisance claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, it might be more 
difficult regarding barriers to entry.  First, the harm of a member in society 
will likely be similar if not slightly different from others within society.  
Second, even if an individual has suffered a harm different than that of the 
general public, such as the death of a family member, the court will likely 
dismiss the case.  Although somehow disregarding these when considering 
a municipality as a plaintiff, a court might base their conclusion on 
intervening causes or contributory negligence.  Moreover, a court could 
make a distinction between the monetary harm at large felt by the 
government and the harm on an individual level (even if such harm could 
be the same on different magnitudes).  
Furthermore, by allowing pharmaceutical manufacturers to be held 
liable for the use of their medication by patients, whether lawfully used or 
not, could lead manufacturers to withhold new medications that could 
benefit society for fear of litigation.  In addition, the pharmaceutical 
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industry is already heavily regulated at the state and federal level.  If a state 
wished to deter pharmaceutical companies from certain conduct, then 
additional legislation would be more feasible than extending common law 
doctrines through the court system to remedy the harm.  
The doctrine of public nuisance was incorrectly expanded to cover 
this kind of consumer protection.  The traditional consumer protection 
doctrine failed to provide the necessary social and monetary incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to accurately promote, manufacture, and sell 
their products.  The holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceutical brought to 
light a gap in the law where other legal theories have been insufficient to 
hold product manufacturers liable for harm caused as a result of their false 
and misleading marketing tactics.  Therefore, the legislature should get 
involved to extend consumer protection laws further.   
In order to better protect consumers, Congress and state legislature 
should enact statutes that require additional education on the side effects of 
prescriptions, documents should be in layman terms, and the true risks 
associated with addiction or the potential abuse labeled appropriately.  In 
addition, to avoid conflicts of interest, pharmaceutical companies should be 
barred from providing educational classes, symposiums, or conferences 
regarding any medication.  Rather than pharmaceutical companies 
educating doctors on what to prescribe, doctors should rely on their medical 
school training and other credible sources in determining the best 
prescriptions for their patients.   
If the legislature fails to enact proper measures to account for this 
gap in consumer protection and if a court believes that the extension has 
gone too far, rather than litigate under the doctrine of public nuisance, the 
doctrines of negligence, product liability, fraud, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and other doctrines directed at consumer protection 
could be used against the manufacturers that contributed to the opioid 




Although the conduct of the defendants was unethical and 
questionable, the extension of public nuisance has gone too far from its 
common-law roots. The holding in State v. Purdue Pharmaceuticals should 
be reversed for extending beyond traditional parameters of public nuisance.  
The doctrine of public nuisance is now another ground for consumers to 
remedy an injury that occurs outside the control of manufacturers, even if 
harm seems attenuated or remote from the control of the alleged tortfeasor.   
In conclusion, the doctrine of public nuisances was incorrectly 
extended to cover areas of consumer protection.  In addition, the Judge 
disregarded the traditional notions of public right and proximate cause 
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within the doctrine of public nuisance. The Judge was likely persuaded by 
the need to protect the public from harm along with the negative perception 
towards the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, the true impact of the 
extension has yet to be seen. Therefore, if the legislature has different 
intentions for the pharmaceutical industry, then they should create statutes 
that limit or indicate additional ways of shielding or holding 
pharmaceuticals companies accountable for their manufacturing, 
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Addiction is a serious public health issue. Addiction plagues 
individuals, families, and communities. If you or someone you know is 
suffering from addiction, reach out to your local doctor about possible 
treatment or recovery plans.  
 
 
 
